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EXAMINING THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION
APPEALS’ SOCIAL VISIBILITY REQUIREMENT FOR
VICTIMS OF GANG VIOLENCE SEEKING ASYLUM
Elyse Wilkinson*
[A]djudication [of a particular social group claim] is not a conventional lawyer’s
exercise of applying a legal litmus test to ascertain facts; it is a global appraisal of
an individual’s past and prospective situation in a particular cultural, social,
political, and legal milieu, judged by a test which, though it has legal and
linguistic limits, has a broad humanitarian purpose.1

I. INTRODUCTION
Since the late 1990s, Latin America has been plagued by gang violence. The
increasingly organized and progressively larger gangs are known as the Mara
Salvatrucha 13 (MS-13) and the 18th Street Gang (collectively referred to as the
“Mara” in this Comment).2 These gangs are ubiquitous within certain Latin
American countries and pose a serious threat to the economic and social stability of
the region.3 The targets of the Mara are mostly youth between the ages of fifteen
and eighteen (but as young as eight), women, and those who decry the gang’s
violence. Resistance to the Mara has resulted in death for many.4 The substantial
disruption to the peace and safety of society and the states’ current inability to
control the gangs has forced many individuals who have been targeted by the
gangs’ violence to flee their home countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and
Honduras to seek asylum in the United States.5 Very few people trying to escape
gang violence are granted asylum and the denial has serious consequences for
many of them.
Part I of this Comment will introduce the gang problem Latin America is
* J.D. Candidate, 2010, University of Maine School of Law.
1. Alexander Aleinikoff, Protected Characteristics and Social Perceptions: An Analysis of the
Meaning of ‘Membership of a Particular Social Group,’ REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 263, 309 (Erika Feller et al. eds., 2003) (quoting R v. IAT and Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t,
ex parte Shah, English Court of Appeal, [1997] Imm. AR 145 at 153) [hereinafter Aleinikoff].
2. Although they will be discussed collectively in this paper, the MS-13 and 18th Street Gang are
rivals. The etymology of Mara Salvatrucha is not consistent. One version is that Mara is slang for
“gang” or “group of friends” and Salvatrucha is slang for Salvadorian. The numbers “13 and 18” were
added to represent the gangs’ territorial area in Los Angeles. Former Gang Member Details Life Inside
MS-13 (National Public Radio radio broadcast Apr. 22, 2008) [hereinafter Former Gang Member].
3. Press Release, Org. of Am. States, Gangs Pose a Serious Threat to Hemisphere, El Salvador
Official Tells OAS (Nov. 30, 2005) available at http://www.oas.org/OASpage/press_releases/
press_release.asp?sCodigo=E-274/05.
4. INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, NO PLACE TO HIDE: GANG, STATE AND
CLANDESTINE VIOLENCE IN EL SALVADOR 76 (2007), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/
programs/hrp/documents/FinalElSalvadorReport(3-6-07).pdf [hereinafter Int’l Human Rights Clinic].
5. See, e.g., Gabriela Reardon, A Long Walk From Honduras to Escape Gang Vengeance, CITY
LIMITS, Nov. 26, 2007, http://www.citylimits.org/content/articles/viewarticle.cfm?article_id=3450
(describing the journey of a young man who chose to flee Honduras in order to escape from the Mara
and pressure to continue participating in crimes).
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grappling with and describe the nature of asylum. Part II of this paper will address
the history of these Latin American street gangs—the Mara—and factors
contributing to the gangs’ current ability to undermine the stability of El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras. It will also discuss recent governmental attempts to
deal with the gang crisis. Part III will discuss the asylum process and the statutory
framework for bringing an asylum claim. Part IV will describe the development of
the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) recent “social visibility” requirement
into the particular social group definition, as observed in the BIA and court of
appeals case law. Next, the international and the UNHCR’s approach to social
visibility will be examined. It will be argued that the recent requirement
significantly decreases the likelihood of success for future victims of gang violence
who bring asylum petitions under the “particular social group” category. Part V
will examine the problems with a social visibility requirement and suggest that the
imposition of social visibility is insupportable. Next, solutions will be discussed,
including the BIA’s ability to rectify this problem by reverting to traditional
particular social group framework. Finally, Part V will conclude that those who
claim asylum based on Mara persecution are deserving of asylum, and returning to
the Acosta framework is a way to leave open a possibility for gang based asylum
claims in the future. However, the social visibility component may have merit as an
alternative test and that approach should be cautiously explored.
Asylum is driven by the broad humanitarian purpose of offering the United
States as a safe-haven for an individual being persecuted in their country when the
country has failed to protect the individual. Framing this goal is a very specific
statutory framework for bringing an asylum claim. Asylum is awarded only to
“refugees”—a relatively small category of people that can prove they were
persecuted because of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership
in a particular social group. The particular social group category has been used
increasingly in the past years by victims of gang violence, and also by others
seeking asylum based on their sexual orientation, gender, domestic violence, and
victims or potential victims of female genital mutilation.6 The social group
category has been described as “pushing the boundaries” of refugee law7 because
of the variety of groups who bring claims under the statute, paired with the fact that
the category itself was never well defined. Generally, victims of gang violence
bring claims for asylum under the social group category because the absence of a
highly-particularized definition allows for claims to be more individualized.
The ability to have particularized claims means immigration judges are often
confronted with social groups that are a matter of first impression. This means the
judges have wide latitude in defining what constitutes a “particular social group.”
While case law continues to define what groups are a cognizable particular social
group, many individuals have asserted membership in a group that the immigration
court, BIA, or court of appeals has not yet recognized—making it difficult for
petitioners with the same or similar social groups to be granted asylum. For
6. See, e.g., Nabulwala v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 1115 (8th Cir. 2007) (homosexuals); Matter of
Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819 (B.I.A. 1990) (homosexuals); Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233 (3d Cir.
1993) (gender); Matter of R-A, 24 I. & N. Dec. 629 (B.I.A. 2008) (domestic violence); Matter of
Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (B.I.A. 1996) (opposition to female gentile mutilation).
7. Aleinikoff, supra note 1, at 264.
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example, some groups that have brought gang related asylum claims that have not
been recognized are: affluent Guatemalans,8 young males9 and those who claim to
categorically resist gang membership.10 However, this problem is not limited to
gang related claims.
Victims of the Mara’s violence have recently been unsuccessful in obtaining
asylum because the BIA, the branch of the Department of Justice responsible for
identifying standards and uniform definitions of immigration law,11 has defined
“particular social group” more narrowly. The BIA now requires that asylum
applicants who frame claims under the “particular social group” category
demonstrate that their social group be “socially visible,”12 meaning objectively
recognized in society. Taking this lead from the BIA, some circuit courts have also
imposed a social visibility requirement.13 However, as will be discussed, the social
visibility requirement is ambiguous, leaving practitioners without appropriate
guidance for how to bring future asylum claims under the particular social group
category. Further, the addition of social visibility also contravenes what the United
Nations (UN) has set as the definition for a particular social group. Lastly, this
new requirement creates evidentiary proof problems that nearly no victim of gang
violence can meet.14
II. HISTORY
A. A Gang is Born
Beginning in the 1980s, El Salvador experienced a long and violent civil war.15
As a result, more than 700,000 El Salvadorians fled to the United States16 and some
were granted Temporary Protected Status in 1990.17 Of those refuges that settled in
8. In Re A-M-E & J-G-U, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69 (B.I.A. 2007).
9. Gomez-Benitez v. United States, 295 F. App’x 324 (11th Cir. 2008).
10. Matter of E-A-G, 24 I. & N. Dec. 591 (B.I.A. 2007).
11. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1) (2008).
12. See infra notes 149 to 170 and accompanying text discussing In Re C-A, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951
(B.I.A. 2006); Matter of S-E-G, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579 (B.I.A. 2008); Matter of A-M-E and J-G-U, 24 I &
N. Dec. 69 (B.I.A. 2007).
13. See infra notes 152 to 170 and accompanying text discussing the BIA’s development of the
social visibility requirement.
14. In at least one instance, however, an applicant has successfully circumvented the social visibility
requirement by stating that his particular social group was based on his “subset of nuclear [] family at
which MS 13 directed its persecution because [] (the respondent’s brother) refused to join MS 13.” In
the Matter of Respondent (name redacted), No. [], slip op. at 3 (Decision and Order (Immigration Ct.
June 11, 2009)) (on file with author). The immigration judge recognized that subsequent cases had
imposed a social visibility requirement but found that respondent’s case satisfied this burden because his
group was not amorphous and was particular and visible. Id. at 3-4. This opinion is good news for gang
victims whose families have also been attacked by the gang and who can establish that they were
targeted by the Mara because of their familial association. In the above case, the respondent’s family
testified on his behalf.
15. Int’l Human Rights Clinic, supra note 4, at 2-3.
16. U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEVS., CENTRAL AMERICAN & MEXICO GANG ASSESSMENT 45 (2006),
available at http://www.crin.org/docs/usaid_gang_assessment.pdf (estimating that by 1990 more than
700,000 El Salvadorians had settled in the US) [hereinafter USAID].
17. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 244, 66 Stat. 210, 214 (1952)
(governing Temporary Protection Statute). See also 8 C.F.R. § 244 (2009) (implementing regulations).
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the United States, 52 percent were in west downtown Los Angeles,18 an area
previously dominated by Mexican and Mexican-American gangs.19 Similarly,
Guatemala experienced a war during the same period, and many Guatemalans fled
to the United States.20
The roots of both the MS-13 and the 18th Street Gang are in Los Angeles
during the early 1990s. El Salvadorian and Guatemalan refugees created and
joined gangs to protect themselves from other gangs already established in the Los
Angeles neighborhoods.21 In the early 1990s, the United States initiated its
immigration reform policy and a “get tough on gangs” approach.22 As a result,
thousands of gang members were deported back to El Salvador and Guatemala.23
However, sections of the Mara remain in Los Angeles today,24 and Mara activity
has been found in almost every state in the United States.25
B. Return to Broken Homes: Gangs Take Hold
The MS-13 and 18th Street Gang members brought their gang culture back
with them to their native countries when they were deported.26 The large number
of violent gang members, combined with the social, economic, and political
instabilities in El Salvador and Honduras, created an environment ripe for the Mara
to root in these countries.27 The Mara was initially in El Salvador and then spread
to Guatemala and Honduras and, to a lesser extent, Mexico.28 Today, El Salvador

Some El Salvadorians who were illegally in the United States were granted legal status under this
statute. Id. Jessica Vaughan & Jon Feere, Taking Back the Streets: ICE and Local Law Enforcement
Target Immigrant Gang, BACKGROUNDER (Ctr. For Immigration Studies, Washington, D.C.), Oct. 2008,
at 5, available at http://www.cis.org/articles/2008/back1208.pdf. See also Juan J. Fogelbach, Comment,
Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and Ley Anti Mara: El Salvador’s Struggle to Reclaim Social Order, 7 SAN
DIEGO INT’L L. J. 223, 227 (2005). Inhabitants of El Salvador and Honduras are currently eligible for
temporary protection status. U.S.C.I.S., Temporary Protection Status, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/
uscis (follow “Services & Benefits”; then follow “Humanitarian Benefits”; then follow “Temporary
Protection Status”).
18. Fogelbach, supra note 17, at 227.
19. WASH. OFFICE ON LATIN AM., CENTRAL AMERICAN GANG-RELATED ASYLUM: A RESOURCE
GUIDE § 1 (2008), available at http://www.wola.org/media/Gangs/WOLA_Gang_Asylum_Guide.pdf
[hereinafter WOLA].
20. Id. § 4.
21. Id. (stating that the gangs in Los Angeles were created by El Salvadorians and were made up
mainly of El Salvadorians, however, many Guatemalans joined as well).
22. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996). See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. NO. 104132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), codified in various sections of 18 U.S.C. (2006). These laws immediately
impact the El Salvadorians, Guatemalans, and Hondurans in the United States because portions of the
bill expanded the scope of crime-related grounds that render a lawful permanent resident deportable.
23. More than 33,000 El Salvadorans were deported from the U.S. between 1998 and 2004. U.S.
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2004 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, tbl.43 (2004).
24. See FBI Cracks Down on Gangs at L.A.’s MacArthur Park (National Public Radio radio
broadcast June 2, 2008) (discussing Los Angeles’ attempt to eliminate the Mara).
25. Vaughan & Feere, supra note 17, at 1.
26. USAID, supra note 16, at 16.
27. Vaughan & Feere, supra note 17, at 6; Int’l Human Rights Clinic, supra note 4, at 20.
28. Vaughan & Feere, supra note 17, at 6.
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is known as one of the most dangerous countries in the Latin American world,29
and the gangs undermine the security of the country and government stability.
Some estimate that there are approximately 10,500 gang members in El Salvador
alone.30
The Mara were originally more territorially oriented, operating “clikas,” or
neighborhood groups, but as the Mara evolved they became more organized with
an increasingly “vertical” structure and better coordinated between clikas.31 The
increased organization has exacerbated the police’s inability to control the problem.
Specifically, the evolution of the gang structure has allowed jailed gang members
continue to operate their clikas from jail, whereas before once in jail they were
closed off from the gang. The vertical structure also allows gang leaders who are
jailed or killed to be quickly replaced, making it harder to fight the gangs.
Recently, the gangs have also become more transnational which means victims of
gang violence have a harder time escaping by moving to another part of the country
or a different country.32 In the past, they have used tattoos to identify one another,
as well as clothing and hairstyles, but police crackdowns on gangs and laws
forbidding gang tattoos have curbed this behavior.33
The Mara use various violent coercion techniques to recruit new members, and
those who resist the recruiting efforts often find themselves being further targeted
or killed by the Mara.34 The Mara recruit new members primarily at schools and
prisons and may target students as young as the second grade.35 However, they
may choose not to fully recruit certain individuals into the gang and extort them
instead. For instance, the gang will threaten to kill or kidnap the children of

29. USAID, supra note 16, at 44.
30. However, the National Council on Public Security says that this number is closer to 39,000. Id.
at 45. USAID also estimates that there are approximately 10,500 gang members in El Salvador; 36,000
in Honduras; and 14,000 in Guatemala. Id. at 17. The populations of these countries for mid-2007 were
6,900,000; 7,100,000; and 13,400,000, respectively. POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU, MID-2008
GENERAL POPULATION (2008), http://www.prb.org/Datafinder/Geography/MultiCompare.aspx?
variables=21&regions=77,78,79.
31. Int’l Human Rights Clinic, supra note 4, at 25; Cara Buckley, A Fearsome Gang and Its
Wannabees, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2007 (stating that the MS-13 groups communicate with each other,
even internationally).
32. USAID, supra note 16, at 18 (reporting that although the transnational character of the Mara is
limited, this is changing). Currently Mara gangs are becoming more likely to communicate with other
sections of the gang within the country, and the gang structure is becoming increasingly developed and
organized. See also CELINDA FRANCO, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: THE MS-13 AND 18TH STREET
GANGS: EMERGING TRANSNATIONAL GANG THREATS?, 8-9 (2008), available at http://fpc.state.
gov/documents/organization/102653.pdf (stating that the Mara have both a presence in multiple
countries and a more organized structure—both characteristics of a transnational gang).
33. Int’l Human Rights Clinic, supra note 4, at 26-27.
34. Id. at 30-32. Initiation into the Mara is violent for women—involving either a group beating,
which often leaves the recruits seriously injured, or sexual exploitation. For men it is also a violent
process and overall has also become increasingly violent and may involve killing rival gang members or
other violent missions. However, not all those who participate in Mara activities become initiated gang
members. Some may just perform “errands,” such as collecting renta for the Mara. Id. at 31. See also
Former Gang Member, supra note 2.
35. Vaughan & Feere, supra note 17, at 10.
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businessmen unless they give the gang money.36 Alternatively, the Mara will
collect renta (“rent”) from targeted individuals and businesses, such as bus drivers,
for money or “fees” repeatedly.
Information about the actual structure of the MS-13 and 18th Street Gang is
difficult to obtain.37 Much of the information has been compiled from newspaper
reports, interviews with victims or past gang members, government workers, and
others who provided services to gang members or victims. For asylum applicants
this poses evidentiary problems when they are trying to show the pervasiveness of
the gang problem and how police have either acquiesced to the behavior or are
unable to control the problem. Asylum applicants must also show they cannot
simply relocate to another part of the country, and the lack of information about the
transnational nature of gangs and how they communicate between clikas can make
satisfying this element difficult.
C. El Salvador
Although the civil war in El Salvador ended in 1991, the country continues to
have a weak government and an unstable economy.38 After there were 3,875
homicides in a ten month period from 1998 to 1999, the El Salvadorian president
enacted zero tolerance “Mano Dura” (“firm hand”) policies,39 which criminalized
membership in gangs and unlawful association.40 The international community has
criticized the Mano Dura policies for violating human rights.41 The Supreme Court
of Justice in El Salvador held that the Mano Dura policies were unconstitutional in
2004, days before the initial Maro Dura legislation expired.42 Despite this, El
Salvador continues to enforce its Mano Dura policies.43 This may be due in part
due to their widespread support by the El Salvadorian people.44
Despite the anti-gang legislation, the homicide rate has risen in past years and
jail conditions continue to degrade.45 The Mano Dura policies have forced the
36. According to an ex-gang member named El Faco, the gang has a saying, “If you don’t pay, we
won’t hurt the father—sadly, it’s the children who’ll pay.” Private Assassins Target Gangs in
Guatemala (National Public Radio broadcast Dec. 22, 2008).
37. Int’l Human Rights Clinic, supra note 4, at 20.
38. WOLA, supra note 19, §§ 4, 1.
39. USAID, supra note 16, at 52 (stating that Super Mano Dura resulted in the arrests of more than
11,000 gang members in one year). Id.
40. Fogelbach, supra note 17, at 225 (quoting Rt. 1, ¶ 2 of the Anti-Mara Law) (“A mara is loosely
defined as an unlawful association that disrupts the public order, decorum or good customs of society,
and that meet some or all of the following criteria: a group of people that (1) get together habitually, (2)
mark off segments of territories as their own, (3) use signs or symbols as modes of identification, and
(4) mark their bodies with scars or tattoos.”).
41. CLARE RIBANDO SEELKE, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: GANGS IN CENTRAL AMERICA 9
(2008), available at http://opencrs.com/document/RL34112/2008-10-17. The Mano Dura laws also
make it more difficult for victims to get asylum because they have a harder time showing that the
government acquiesced to the violence.
42. Int’l Human Rights Clinic, supra note 4, at 40 (detailing why the law was struck down).
43. See Fogelbach, supra note 17, at 245. After the El Salvadorian Supreme Court decision, the
Salvadorian legislator passed Ley Anti Mara 2 (LAM-2) on April 2, 2004. LAM-2 is nearly identical to
the LAM-1 but is less vague. LAM-2’s constitutionality has not yet been challenged.
44. Id. at 251-52.
45. Seelke, supra note 41, at 9.
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gangs to be more clandestine in their activities. They have also increased tension
between the gangs and the police because the law allows police to arrest gang
members solely for congregating with one another or having tattoos.46
The homicide rates in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala are extremely
high. In 2004, the rate per 100,000 people was approximately 46 percent in
Honduras, 42 percent in El Salvador, and 35 percent in Guatemala.47 The murder
rate in the United States is about 6 percent.48 However, the government has
recently begun to allocate 20 percent of the anti-gang funds for prevention and
rehabilitation programs.49
D. Guatemala
After a bloody thirty-six year war, the Guatemalan government remains weak
and the economy unstable.50 As a result of the internal struggles and the influx of
deportees from the United States back into the country, the gangs were able to
reestablish and thrive within Guatemala. The gang problem is heightened in
Guatemala because half of its population is under the age of eighteen.51 Unlike El
Salvador or Honduras, Guatemala has not enacted any anti-gang legislation and has
received less criticism for keeping crime prosecution “individualized.”52 However,
the police enacted Plan Escoba (“Broom Plan”), which uses mass detentions as a
means to combat gangs.53 Citizens in some towns, however, feel the government is
not doing enough to protect them and have taken the matter into their hands,
conducting “security patrols” where groups of men armed with machetes find gang
members and turn them over to the police or kill them.54
E. Honduras
Honduras did not experience a war like in El Salvador or Guatemala, but the
Cold War and regional conflicts left Honduras with serious economic problems.55
Honduras is an extremely poor and young country.56 Honduras has been identified
as one of the most dangerous countries in the world, and both the MS-13 and the
18th Street Gang are entrenched in Honduras’s largest cities.57
To deal with the growing gang crisis, Honduras amended its penal code to
allow arrests based on illicit association and then implemented anti-Mara

46. WOLA, supra note 19, §§ 3, 4.
47. Vaughan & Feere, supra note 17, at 3.
48. Id.
49. SEELKE, supra note 41, at 9.
50. USAID, supra note 16, at 62-63.
51. Id. at 64.
52. Id. at 78.
53. WOLA, supra note 19, §§ 4, 3.
54. Fed Up, Ordinary Guatemalans Turn to Vigilantism (National Public Radio broadcast Dec. 23,
2008), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=98614371&ps=rs.
55. WOLA, supra note 19, §§ 1, 5.
56. USAID, supra note 16, at 91 (stating that about 71 percent of the population is poor and 41
percent is under the age of fourteen).
57. Id. at 92.
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legislation in 2001.58 As with the Mano Dura policies in El Salvador, Honduras’s
legislation was criticized by the international community for alleged abuses and
civil liberties violations of those suspected of gang membership.59 Honduras also
has a severe prison over-crowding problem.60 The gangs are segregated from the
rest of the prison population and they are offered no rehabilitation services.61 The
police force in Honduras is under-staffed. Thus, many question the effectiveness of
the anti-Mara legislation.62 In 2006, the government launched “Operation
Thunder,” which increased the number of police and military controls and
conducted joint raids in search of gang members, leading to 1,600 arrests.63 These
too have been criticized by the international community.64
It is recognized that the gang problem in Honduras, Guatemala, and El
Salvador is beyond the governments’ control, despite their efforts.65 Scholars and
citizens allege that the anti-Mara legislation has only made the problem worse by
forcing the gangs to be more clandestine and become more organized.66
Specifically, the governments are unable to provide citizens with appropriate
protection from the Mara. In rural areas the problem is even worse, and in many
neighborhoods the clikas dominate. Further, it is rare that people who witness the
gangs’ atrocities are willing to serve as actual witnesses because they are not
afforded any police protection. Lastly, according to a study by the Harvard Law
Human Rights Clinic, the governments rarely investigate or prosecute gang
members.67 The civilian population is largely without any government protection,
and there is no barrier between the citizens and the gang. A Honduran citizen
described his experience as being “like the only one in a war without a weapon.”
Other citizens feel that joining the gang is the only alternative to death.68
III. ASYLUM LAW
A. The Asylum Process
An asylum applicant has three potential ways to request relief: asylum under
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),69 withholding of removal,70 or relief
58. Id. at 96 (the anti-Mara legislation allows police to arrest youth who are congregating and look
like gang members).
59. SEELKE, supra note 41, at 8.
60. Central America: Bringing It All Back Home, THE ECONOMIST, May 22, 2004, 31, 32
(describing a fire at the San Pedro Sula jail which was meant for only 800 inmates but had 2,200). See
also Int’l Human Rights Clinic, supra note 4, at 55 (stating that in February 2006, there were more than
3,000 gang members in El Salvadorian prisons and also describing other prison “massacres”).
61. USAID, supra note 16, at 97.
62. Id.
63. SEELKE, supra note 41, at 9.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 6.
66. Int’l Human Rights Clinic, supra note 4, at 26.
67. Id. at 61-67.
68. Id. at 76-77.
69. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 208(a), 94 Stat. 108 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1158(a) (2008)).
70. 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2006). “Withholding from removal” implements the United States nonrefoulement obligations under Article 3 of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,
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under the U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or
Degrading Treatment, or Punishment (CAT).71 All three claims may be brought at
the same time, but they do not provide the same type of relief72 and do not have the
same burdens of proof. Asylum is generally the more coveted form of relief than
relief granted under CAT or withholding of removal because, if granted asylum, an
applicant can apply for permanent residency after one year.73
The statutory framework for asylum and withholding of removal are the same,
but the burden of proof is higher for withholding of removal.74 As a result, though
applicants may bring both claims, a court will often only reach the merits of the
asylum claim. However, relief under asylum is discretionary: an asylum officer or
immigration judge may find an applicant eligible but choose to deny their
petition.75 Certain types of individuals are ineligible for asylum, such as

July 28, 1951) 19 U.S.T. 6264, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter 1951 Convention]. The principle of nonrefoulement prohibits a person from being returned to a country where his or her life or freedom would
be threatened because of their race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular
social group.
71. United Nations Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading
Treatment, or Punishment, Dec. 22, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20 (1988). [hereinafter CAT]. The
United States signed CAT on April 18, 1988, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(1), and Congress
passed the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act (“FARRA”) in 1988 to implement Article 3 of
CAT. See PUB. L. NO. 105-277, Div. G, Title XXII, 112 Stat. 2681-821 (codified as a note to 8 U.S.C. §
1231). The implementing regulations for CAT are found in 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16 to 1208.18. Article 3
states that “[n]o State party shall expel, return or extradite a person to another State where there are
substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.” To be
eligible, an applicant must show that “is it more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if
removed to the proposed country of removal” and that the torture was instigated or inflicted “with the
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in official capacity.” CAT, part I art.
1. Under the CAT, the applicant will have to establish both that they were tortured by the gang and that
the government either acquiesced to the torture or failed to do anything about it once they were aware of
the behavior. Id.
72. Under asylum, an applicant granted relief may apply for permanent residence after one year.
I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 428-29 n.6 (1987). Under “withholding from removal,” the
successful applicant is only given a right not to be removed to the country of persecution. See I.N.S. v.
Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 419-20 (1999).
73. 8 C.F.R. § 209.2(a)(ii) (2009).
74. An applicant must show that he or she is a refugee and establish persecution or a well-founded
fear of persecution. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006). An applicant also has the burden of showing
that membership in a particular social group is a “central reason” for persecution. Id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i)
(2006). Importantly, the REAL ID Act amended the INA to state that persecution on one of the five
grounds “was or will be at least one central reason for persecuting the applicant.” REAL ID Act of
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 101(a)(3)(B)(i)(A) 119 Stat. 303. The burden of proof under withholding
of removal is “more likely than not” or a “clear probability of persecution,” which is a higher standard
than well founded fear and requires objective evidence to show that it is more likely than not that the
applicant will be subject to persecution if deported. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(2) (2009); CardozaFonseca, 480 U.S. at 430. Under the CAT the applicant must show that it is more likely than not they
will suffer intentionally inflicted cruel and inhuman treatment that either is not lawfully sanctioned by
that country or is lawfully sanctioned by that country, but defeats the object and purpose of CAT. See 8
C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2) (2009). Unlike “withholding of removal,” the testimony of the applicant, if
credible, may be enough to satisfy this burden. Id.
75. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 208.14 (a) & (b) (2009). See also CardozaFronseca, 480 U.S. at 428 (stating that the Attorney General is not required to grant asylum, even to
somebody who meets the statutory definition of refugee).
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individuals who participated in past persecution or those have been convicted of a
serious crime—making it nearly impossible for ex-gang members to be granted
asylum.76 This Comment focuses only on the courts’ analysis of asylum claims in
relation to those who fear persecution based on gang violence.
Individuals applying for asylum may make either an “affirmative” or a
“defensive” application. In either case applicants have the burden of proof to
establish that they are eligible for asylum.77 Applicants who make affirmative
claims will begin the asylum process on their own initiative with an asylum
officer.78 An applicant who is in the United States illegally and is denied his or her
affirmative asylum application will be referred to the Department of Justice, which
will place the applicant in removal proceedings.79 Once in removal proceedings,
the applicant can make a defensive asylum claim before an immigration judge.80 In
addition to a referral from the affirmative asylum process, one can assert a
defensive claim after being arrested by the Department of Homeland Security.81
The defensive asylum process is adversarial, with the potential for witnesses,
exhibits, and cross examination.82 From 1999 to 2004, 19 percent of all affirmative
asylum applications that were adjudicated were ultimately approved.83
If an application for asylum arises affirmatively, an asylum officer will
interview the applicant84 and may grant asylum or refer the case to an immigration
judge.85 Immigration courts are run by the Executive Officer for Immigration
Review, which is part of the Department of Justice.86 Immigration judges are
administrative judges within the Department of Justice. They conduct full
proceedings, and their decisions are final unless appealed to the BIA.87
Additionally, immigration judges have jurisdiction to make decisions under both

76.
77.
78.
79.

8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2) (2006).
8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a) (2009).
Id. § 208.9(b).
See TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (TRAC), SYRACUSE UNIV., TRAC
IMMIGRATION REPORT: THE ASYLUM PROCESS (2006), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/159/
[hereinafter TRAC Asylum Process].
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. Asylum seekers who are represented by lawyers have a higher success rate than those who
are not. The applicant’s country of nationality may also play a role in the asylum seekers’ chances of
getting asylum. El Salvador, Haiti and Mexico are denied about 80 percent of the time, while Burma
and Afghanistan were approved 70 percent of the time. Id. Recently, the asylum process has been
criticized because of the wide disparities in the rate at which immigration judges grant asylum. A recent
study done by three law professors found that the sex of the judge and geographic location of the court
may determine the outcome. See Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum
Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 332-342 (2007).
84. 8 C.F.R. § 208.9 (2009).
85. Id. § 208.14(b) & (c)(1). For instance, a case may be referred to an immigration judge because
of an adverse credibility finding, giving the applicant more time to establish their testimony.
Alternatively, the applicant may be found credible but the judge may decide she needs more information
to establish persecution or another element.
86. Dep’t.
of
Justice,
Executive
Officer
for
Immigration
Review
(EOIR)
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/background.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2009).
87. Id.
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the INA and CAT.88 Further, immigration judges have almost complete discretion
in determining findings of fact and the applicant’s credibility because the standard
of review on appeal is “clear error.”89
If an applicant is denied any form of requested relief, he or she may appeal to
the BIA.90 Like the Immigration Court, the BIA is an administrative body. There
are fifteen members on the board who are appointed by the Attorney General. The
board is divided into three-judge panels, which review appeals from each
immigration court in the country91 and decide cases by a majority vote.92 The BIA
almost always does a “paper review” of the cases and rarely hears oral argument.93
The BIA reviews facts by a “clear error” standard,94 while questions of law and
other issues are reviewed de novo.95 The BIA decisions are binding on all
Immigration Judges unless the rules are modified by Congress, the Attorney
General, or the BIA.96 Importantly, the board’s decisions “provide clear and
uniform guidance to [Department of Homeland Security], the immigration judges,
and the general public on the proper interpretation and administration of the
[Immigration and Nationality] Act and its implementing regulations.”97
If the BIA does not grant the applicant asylum, the applicant may appeal

88. 8 C.F.R. § 208.1(a) (2009).
89. Id. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i).
90. Id. § 1003.1(b).
91. Id. § 1003.1(a)(2)(ii)(3).
92. Id. However, in certain situations a case may be decided by only one judge. For example, when
a party fails to specify the reasons for appeal, a single board member may dismiss the appeal. See id. §
1003.1(d)(2).
93. Id. § 1003.1(e)(7).
94. Id. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i).
95. Id. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii).
96. Id. § 1003.1(d)(7).
97. Id. § 1003.1(d)(1). In 1999, the Justice Department made various “streamlining” reforms
designed to accelerate the asylum process. Richard Acello, Asylum Logjam, 91 A.B.A. J., Oct. 2005,
18, 20. Although these reforms aimed to diminish the BIA’s extensive case backlog at the time, they
have shifted the pending cases from the BIA to the courts of appeals. Id. at 18. See also David A.
Martin, 84 INTERPRETER RELEASES 2069, 2070 (2007), available at Westlaw, 84 No. 35 INTERREL 69
(commenting that the circuit court case load for appeals from the BIA has expanded to 17 percent in
2006). The Second and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals have seen the greatest shift, with appeals from
the BIA jumping 463 percent and 1,448 percent, respectively. Acello, supra note 97, at 20. Further
amendments were made in 2002, which included a provision allowing the BIA to affirm an immigration
judge’s decision without a written opinion and another that increased the number of cases heard by a
single immigration judge. There is also no longer “de novo review of factual issues and . . . the grounds
for mandatory dismissal” were expanded. Id. (Acello also argues that this is a problem because the
immigration judges have different views on the law; without written opinions there is inadequate
analysis, and the courts of appeals have expressed dissatisfaction. However, the number of cases in the
BIA’s backlog has been reduced from 56,000 in August 2002 to 33,000 in October 2004). Id. See also
Margaret Graham Tebo, Asylum Ordeals: Some Immigrants Are ‘Ground to Bits’ in a System That
Leaves Immigration Judges Impatient, Appellate Courts Irritated and Lawyers Frustrated, 92 A.B.A. J.
36, 40 Nov. 2006 (arguing that the streamlining has resulted in little more than “rubberstamping” the
B.I.A. opinions and that immigration lawyers have “beg[u]n to question the fairness of the process”).
Lastly, the number of judges was reduced from twenty-three to eleven. Id. at 40; Press Release,
Executive Office for Immigration Review, Dep’t. of Justice, Attorney General Issues Final Rule
Reforming Board of Immigration Appeals Procedures (Aug. 23, 2002), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/press/02/BIARestruct.pdf.
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directly to the federal court of appeals for the circuit in which the applicant
resides.98 The court of appeals then reviews the BIA’s decision under an abuse of
discretion standard.99 Nationwide, the courts of appeals overturn about forty
percent of the BIA’s decisions.100 An order of deportation will be issued if at any
time the applicant is not granted relief and he or she is otherwise in the country
illegally. The decisions made by the courts of appeals are binding on the BIA for
cases arising in the same circuit.101 As with all types of cases, the United States
Supreme Court rarely grants certiorari.
B. Defining a Particular Social Group
Under the INA, the Attorney General has authority to confer asylum on any
alien who qualifies as a refugee.102 When the United States ratified the 1967 UN
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,103 it incorporated the definition of
“refugee” from the 1951 UN Convention Relating into the Status of Refugees.104
In 1980, Congress passed the Refugee Act, formally codifying the 1951
convention’s definition of “refugee” into United States law. 105 A refugee is
defined by the convention as:
[A]ny person who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to
avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or
a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
106
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.

Under both the convention and the Refugee Act, in order to qualify for asylum, an
applicant has the burden of showing: that they have either suffered persecution or
they have a well-founded fear of persecution in their home country; that such
persecution or fear is based on race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or
membership in a particular social group;107 and that the government is “unable or
unwilling” to provide protection. Generally, the government’s inability to control
98. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2) (2006).
99. For a court of appeals to reverse on factual grounds, the asylum seeker must “show that the
evidence he presented was so compelling that no reasonable fact finder could fail to find the requisite
fear of persecution.” I.N.S. v. Elias-Zacharias, 502 U.S. 478, 483-84 (1992).
100. Tebo, supra note 97, at 39.
101. Dep’t.
of
Justice,
Executive
Officer
for
Immigration
Review
(EOIR)
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/background.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2009).
102. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(A) (2006).
103. 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6225, 606
U.N.T.S. 268 [hereinafter 1967 Protocol].
104. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150. This is so
because the protocol was not an amendment to the 1951 Convention but incorporates the 1951
Conventions provisions by reference, so by becoming a signatory to the protocol the United States
accepted the terms of the 1951 Convention. See JAMES HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW 111 (2005).
105. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006).
106. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006); Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note
104, 19 U.S.T. 6261, 189 U.N.T.S. 150; see also Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 235-36 (B.I.A.
1985) (the applicant must show that he is not able to relocated to another city within the country to
avoid persecution).
107. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2005).
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the problem is demonstrated with research documenting the existence of the
problem in the applicant’s home country, such as newspaper articles, reports from
organizations like Amnesty International, the UNHCR, and the U.S. Department of
State, affidavits from friends or family, expert testimony, and the applicant’s
testimony. However, because persecution by non-state actors, unlike governmentsponsored persecution, is amorphous, as discussed previously, this poses unique
problems for the asylum officers and judges adjudicating the claim. Non-state
persecution is much harder to prove, often less visible, and forces the adjudicator to
decide if the government’s inability or unwillingness rises to the appropriate level
of inaction to warrant granting asylum.108
There is no universal definition of “persecution.”109 Whether or not an
individual faced harm amounting to persecution is a fact-specific analysis that is
taken up in each case.110 However, in each case the applicant must establish that he
or she was persecuted or fears persecution “on account of” the category that he or
she specifies.111 The social group category must have characteristics that set them
apart from the general population.112 There is, however, no requirement that the
social group be cohesive or that all members know each other or even associate
with one another.113
The applicant’s proof of well-founded fear has both a subjective and objective
component. Subjectively, applicants must show either that they personally have
suffered persecution or fear persecution in their home countries. Objectively, the
applicant must demonstrate that a reasonable person in the applicant’s position
would fear persecution on account of one of the five grounds.114 The applicant’s
subjective belief is a credibility determination made by the asylum officer or
judge.115
108. Michael G. Heyman, Asylum, Social Group Membership and the Non-State Actor: The
Challenge of Domestic Violence, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 767, 787-89 (2003).
109. U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR
DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS para. 51 (1992) [hereinafter UNHCR Handbook].
110. Id. at para. 52.
111. The United States Supreme Court held that the persecution must be on account of the victim’s
membership in one of the groups, not the persecutor’s belief or motive. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 482.
112. Expert Roundtable organized by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the
International Institute of Humanitarian Law, Summary Conclusions: Membership of a Particular Social
Group, in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 312, 313 (Erika Feller et al. eds., 2003)
[hereinafter Expert Roundtable].
113. Id. See also infra note 6.
114. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 451 n.32. “An alien possesses a well-founded fear of persecution
if a reasonable person in her circumstances would fear persecution if she were to be returned to her
native country.” Id. (quoting Guevara-Flores v. I.N.S., 786 F.2d 1242, 1249 (5th Cir. 1986). “In
contrast, the term ‘well-founded fear’ requires that (1) the alien have a subjective fear, and (2) that this
fear have enough of a basis that it can be considered well-founded.” Id. (quoting Cardoza-Fonseca v.
I.N.S., 767 F.2d 1448, 1452-53 (9th Cir. 1985)). The Supreme Court also stated that an individual can
have a well-founded fear even if the chance of the event is less than 50 percent. Id. at 431. “[T]he
‘well-founded fear’ standard would indicate ‘that so long as an objective situation is established by the
evidence, it need not be shown that the situation will probably result in persecution, but it is enough that
persecution is a reasonable possibility.’” Id. at 440 (quoting I.N.S. v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 424-25
(1984)).
115. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3)(B)(iii) (2006) states that:
(iii) Credibility Determination
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Of the five statutory grounds for relief, the particular social group category is
the least well-defined,116 but the second most popular category for asylum
claims.117 Sweden suggested the particular social group category be included in the
definition of “refugee” at the convention along with the four other grounds, and it
was added to the definition of “refugee” at the 1951 Refugee Convention on a
unanimous vote without debate.118 The convention never defined a “particular
social group” or its intended purpose and there is no unified definition of
“particular social group” within the United States or the international community
at-large.119 The Department of Justice has recognized the absence of a clear
definition and has attempted to bring clarity with proposed changes to the Code of
Federal Regulations.120
In United States jurisprudence, the first key decision interpreting membership
in a particular social group was the BIA’s decision in In re Acosta.121 The Acosta
decision set forth an analytical framework that has been characterized as the
“immutable approach.” Under this framework social groups based on gender, tribal
and clan membership, sexual orientation, family, and past experiences have been
recognized.122 Acosta has also been used as precedent in other foreign
Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors, a trier of fact may
base a credibility determination on the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the
applicant or witness, the inherent plausibility of the applicant’s or witness’s account, the
consistency between the applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements (whenever
made and whether or not under oath, and considering the circumstances under which the
statements were made), the internal consistency of each such statement, the consistency
of such statements with other evidence of record (including the reports of the
Department of State on country conditions), and any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such
statements, without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to
the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other relevant factor. There is no presumption
of credibility, however, if no adverse credibility determination is explicitly made, the
applicant or witness shall have a rebuttable presumption of credibility on appeal.
See also Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 447 (B.I.A. 1987) (laying out a four-part test for
establishing eligibility for asylum based on well-founded fear).
116. Expert Roundtable, supra note 112, at 312.
117. Anna Marie Gallagher, 2 Immigr. Law Service 2d (West) § 10:138 (2009).
118. Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, Summary
Record of the 19th mtg. at 14, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.3.19 (Nov. 26, 1951).
119. See Stanley Dale Radtke, Defining a Core Zone of Protection in Asylum Law: Refocusing the
Analysis of Membership in a Particular Social Group to Utilize Both the Social Visibility and Group
Immutability Component Approaches, 10 J. L. & SOC. CHALLENGES 22, 30-33 (2008) (stating that the
framers of the convention were influenced by the human rights atrocities stemming from Nazi Germany
which resulted in a hyper-awareness of the international community’s failure to protect refugees. As a
result, the framers wanted to make sure refugees would be protected).
120. Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588, 76, 589-90 (Dec. 7, 2000) (to be
codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208) (while the proposed rules recognized the absence of a clear definition and
attempted to bring some clarity to the particular social group category, there is no indication that the
these proposed rules will be adopted, but they would be included in 8 C.F.R. § 208).
121. 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985) overruled in part by Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec.
439, 439 (B.I.A. 1987) (Mogharrabi stated that the Matter of Acosta court was incorrect in its holding
that the “clear probability” standard for withholding or removal and the “well-founded fear” standard for
asylum are not meaningfully different.).
122. Aleinikoff, supra note 1, at 276. See, e.g., Gomez-Zuluaga v. Att’y Gen., 527 F.3d 330 (3d Cir.
2008) (escape of involuntary servitude); Nabulwala v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 1115 (8th Cir. 2007)
(homosexuals); Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2003) (escaped child soldiers); In re
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jurisdictions.123
However, the applicant in Acosta did not assert a cognizable social group.
Acosta, a thirty-six year old male citizen of El Salvador, claimed that he feared
persecution by guerrillas on account of his membership in a group of COTAXI
drivers and persons engaged in the transportation industry. 124 This “group” was
targeted by the guerillas for refusing to participate in work stoppages.125 The BIA
found that these COTAXI drivers could not be a “particular social group,”
reasoning that being a driver was not an immutable trait because the drivers could
have changed jobs or participated in the work stoppages.126 Thus, the petitioner
had the power to change his group characteristic.127 The BIA determined that
because the other statutory grounds for asylum (political opinion, nationality, race
and religion) are immutable characteristics, the characteristics making up
membership in a particular social group should also be immutable. The BIA
elaborated that persecution on account of membership in a particular social group
refers to:
[P]ersecution that is directed toward an individual who is a member of a group of
persons all of whom share a common, immutable characteristic. The shared
characteristic might be an innate one such as sex, color, or kinship ties, or in some
circumstances it might be a shared past experience such as former military
leadership or land ownership. . . . [I]t must be one that the members of the group
either cannot change, or should not be required to change because it is
fundamental to their individual identities or consciences. Only when this is the
case does the mere fact of membership become something comparable to the other
four grounds of persecution under the Act, namely, something that is beyond the
power of an individual to change or that is so fundamental to his identity or
conscience that it ought not be required to be changed. By construing “persecution
on account of membership in a particular social group” in this manner, we
preserve the concept that refuge is restricted to individuals who are either unable
by their own actions, or as a matter of conscience should not be required, to avoid
128
persecution.

Scholars have identified Acosta as the “middle ground” approach to defining
social groups, allowing for an application that is “sufficiently open ended to allow
for evolution . . . but not so vague as to admit persons without a serious basis for
claim to international protection.”129

Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (B.I.A. 1996) (opposition to female gentile mutilation); In re TobosoAlfonso, 20 I.& N. Dec. 819 (B.I.A. 1990) (homosexuals).
123. Shah & Islam v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [1999] 2 A.C. 629 (H.L.) (United
Kingdom); Ward v. Att’y Gen. of Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689 (Can.); In re G.J., Refugee Appeal No.
1312/93 (N.Z. R.S.A.A. 1995) (New Zealand).
124. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 234.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 233-34. This definition is narrower and more specific than the one provided by the United
Nations. See also UNHCR Handbook, supra note 109. See also infra text and accompanying notes 13335.
129. JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 160-61 (1991) (citations omitted).
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In 1978, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees130 (UNHCR)
issued a Handbook on Procedures for Determining the Status of Refugees
(UNHCR Handbook).131 The UNHCR Handbook was the first attempt to define
the particular social group with more detail, but remained broad. The handbook
defines membership in a particular social group as follows:
77.
A "particular social group" normally comprises persons of similar
background, habits or social status. A claim to fear of persecution under this
heading may frequently overlap with a claim to fear of persecution on other
grounds, i.e. race, religion or nationality.
78. Membership of such a particular social group may be at the root of persecution
because there is no confidence in the group’s loyalty to the Government or
because the political outlook, antecedents or economic activity of its members, or
the very existence of the social group as such, is held to be an obstacle to the
Government’s policies.
79. Mere membership of a particular social group will not normally be enough to
substantiate a claim to refugee status. There may, however, be special
circumstances where mere membership can be a sufficient ground to fear
132
persecution.

In 2001, the UNHCR organized a roundtable discussion on membership in a
particular social group. The summary conclusions from this roundtable stated that
“there is no requirement that a group be cohesive in order to be recognized as a
particular social group within the meaning of the Convention, that is, there needs to
be no showing that all members of a group know each other or associate
together.”133 However, the group must share common characteristics, other than
risk of persecution, which set them apart from the general population and evidence
of persecution may be relevant to determining the social visibility of the group.134
The roundtable group also stated that as the category of membership in a particular
social group evolves the relevance of the “social perception” test could be
considered.135
In 2002, UNHCR issued guidelines defining membership in a particular social
group. Ultimately the Guidelines were meant to supplement the UNHCR
Handbook.136 The Guidelines summarized the two main approaches to defining
“particular social group” used by courts in common law jurisdictions applying the
particular social group requirement to asylum claims. These two approaches were
130. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees was created in 1950 by the
United Nations General Assembly simultaneously with the 1951 Convention on Refugees. The office
was designed to monitor the Convention and cooperate with signatory states on implementing the
Convention, Regulations, or laws created by the Agency or the States. U.N. HIGH COMM’N FOR
REFUGEES, PROTECTING REFUGEES AND THE ROLE OF UNHCR 17-19 (2007).
131. UNHCR Handbook, supra note 109.
132. Id. at ¶¶ 77-79.
133. Expert Roundtable, supra note 112, at 313.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees [UNHCR], Guidelines on International Protection:
“Membership of a particular social group” Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention
and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/02/02 (May 7, 2002)
[hereinafter UNHCR Guidelines].
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the “immutable approach”137 and the “social perceptions” approach.138 The
UNHCR decided to reconcile the two approaches and issued its own standard
definition of a particular social group, which incorporated both approaches. 139 The
definition is as follows:
[A] particular social group is a group of persons who share a common
characteristic other than their risk of being persecuted, or who are perceived as a
group by society. The characteristic will often be one which is innate,
unchangeable, or which is otherwise fundamental to identity, conscience or the
140
exercise of one’s human rights.

Lastly, the UNHCR articulated that the size of the applicant’s stated social group is
irrelevant to the determination of whether a social group exists.141 Although the
UNHCR Handbook is not binding on the United States, the Supreme Court has
recognized the Handbook as highly influential because it explains the United
Nations Protocol ratified by Congress in 1967.142
VI. MOVEMENT TOWARDS SOCIAL VISIBILITY
Prior to the BIA’s imposition of social visibility as a requirement, the First,
Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits included in their determinations of a particular
social group the “social visibility” or social perception inquiry as an important
consideration.143 Social visibility is generally understood to be the extent to which
members of society perceive those with the characteristic in question as members
137. This is the framework used in In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233-34. The UNHCR Guidelines
define this framework as:
An immutable characteristic may be innate (such as sex or ethnicity) or unalterable for
other reasons (such as the historical fact of a past association, occupation or status).
Human rights norms may help to identify characteristics deemed so fundamental to
human dignity that one ought not to be compelled to forego them. A decision-maker
adopting this approach would examine whether the asserted group is defined: (1) by an
innate, unchangeable characteristic, (2) by a past temporary or voluntary status that is
unchangeable because of its historical permanence, or (3) by a characteristic or
association that is so fundamental to human dignity that group members should not be
compelled to forsake it.
UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 136, at 3.
138. This approach examines whether or not a group shares a common characteristic which makes
them a cognizable group or sets them apart from society at large. This has been referred to as the “social
perception” approach. Again, women, families, and homosexuals have been recognized under this
analysis as particular social groups, depending on the circumstances of the society in which they exist.
Id.
139. This was largely the influence of the Refugee Law scholar Professor Aleinikoff. See RADTKE,
supra note 119, at 43 (stating that Aleinikoff’s approach creates a “single test to define for the scope of
protection under a social group claim” not a test that looks both simultaneously at the immutable
characteristic and social visibility components).
140. UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 136, at 3-4.
141. Id. at 5.
142. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 438-39 n.22 (stating that the explanations offered in the U.N.
Handbook do not have the force of law. However, “the Handbook provides significant guidance in
construing the Protocol, to which Congress sought to conform. It has been widely considered useful in
giving content to the obligations that the Protocol establishes.”).
143. See, e.g., Ananeh-Firempong v. I.N.S., 766 F.2d 621 (1st Cir. 1985); Fatin v. I.N.S., 12 F.3d
1233 (3d Cir. 1993); Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2003).
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of a social group.144 However, the Ninth Circuit defined particular social group as
having a voluntary associational relationship, meaning that the group closely
affiliates with one another or is cohesive, but the Ninth Circuit also recognized
groups sharing immutable characteristics.145 Thus, the Ninth Circuit framework
was broader than the approaches in Acosta and other circuits. The Second Circuit
generally followed the Ninth Circuit’s voluntary association standard, but added a
requirement that the particular social group be externally distinguishable and that
this perception of the group is as important as immutability and voluntariness.146
The voluntary association approach has been criticized and rejected by other courts
for being overly broad.147 Critics claim that it would allow asylum for large
segments of the population who, even if they are persecuted, are not a distinct
social group while other groups that have been afforded protection, such as gays
and lesbians, would not be able to satisfy the cohesiveness requirement.148 The
circuit split means that asylum may be granted to an applicant in the Ninth Circuit,
but denied to the same applicant in the First Circuit. The development of the split
between circuits then, created an opportunity for the BIA to attempt to bring
uniformity to the social group analysis.
Amidst the circuit split over the appropriate social group analysis, the BIA has
recently developed its own definition of “particular social group” and did not
adopt, in words or analysis, the definition suggested by the UNHCR, which
represented a significant departure from Acosta. The BIA chose to adopt a
framework similar to the Second Circuit approach, requiring that the particular
social group be socially visible. For those seeking asylum based on gang
persecution then, the probability of succeeding under a “particular social group”
claim became hard to ascertain because of the lack of uniformity among the courts.
In June 2006, the BIA issued the decision of In re C-A,149 which included
social visibility in its analysis of a particular social group. In this case, the court
held that non-criminal drug informants working against the Cali Drug Cartel were
not a particular social group for the purposes of asylum because, among other
things, they do not have the necessary social visibility.150 Referencing a prior BIA
decision, the court noted that they had included social visibility in their
determination of whether or not membership in the Marehan sub-clan in Somalia
144. See, e.g., Matter of E-A-G, 24 I. & N. Dec. 591, 594 (B.I.A. 2007).
145. See, e.g., Hernandez-Montiel v. I.N.S., 225 F.3d 1084, 1092-93 (9th Cir. 2000); SanchezTrujillo v. I.N.S., 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986).
146. Gomez v. I.N.S., 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991). In Gomez, the Second Circuit held that an El
Salvadorian woman’s claim for asylum based on membership in the particular social group of women
abused by guerillas lacked the requisite visibility and particularity and denied her claim. The court
stated that a particular social group “is comprised of individuals who possess some fundamental
characteristics in common which serves to distinguish them in the eyes of the persecutor-or in the eyes
of the outside world in general.” Id. at 664. The court reasoned that the traits for a particular social
group must be “recognizable and discrete” because the other four categories are also "recognizable and
discrete." Id.
147. DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES: ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS
AND ANALYSIS 382 (3rd ed. 1994).
148. Aleinikoff, supra note 1, at 277-78.
149. 23 I. & N. Dec. 951 (B.I.A. 2006), aff’d sub nom. Castillo-Arias v. Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 1190
(11th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, Castillo-Arias v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 1115 (2007).
150. In re C-A, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 960.
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constituted a social group.151 The court then stated that past social groups
identified under the Acosta framework have all been “highly visible,” for instance:
Filipinos of mixed Filipino-Chinese ancestry, young women of a particular tribe
who were opposed to female genital mutilation, and those with former military
leadership or land ownership.152 The court further analyzed the social visibility
component, suggesting that it was an important consideration when determining if
a particular social group existed.153 In rejecting the proposition that the drug
informants were a particular social group, the court reasoned that the informants
were, by their nature, out of the public view and acting on their own free will, thus
not socially visible.154 However, the court explicitly affirmed adherence to the
Acosta formula and stated it was considering “the extent to which members of
society perceive those with the characteristic in question as members of a social
group” as a “relevant factor.”155
In 2007, in In re A-M-E & J-G-U,156 the BIA returned to its decision in In re
C-A. The petitioners were requesting asylum based on persecution in Guatemala for
being affluent Guatemalans, after a family member had been kidnapped and injured
by gang members for ransom.157 Relying on In re Acosta and In re C-A, the court
reasoned that while wealth was not an immutable characteristic, it might have been
fundamental to the petitioner’s identity.158 However, the court held that it did not
need to determine if wealth was fundamental, which may have allowed the
petitioner to qualify for asylum under the Acosta framework, because wealthy
Guatemalans were not “so readily ‘identifiable’ or sufficiently defined as to meet
the requirements of a particular social group . . . .”159 The court then added that
“shared characteristic[s] with the requisite ‘social visibility’ must be considered in
the context of the country of concern and the persecution feared.”160 The court also
reasoned that wealth failed the particularity requirement because it was too
amorphous a concept and the group could compose anywhere from 1 to 20 percent
of the population.161
Next, in In re S-E-G,162 the BIA explicitly imposed a social visibility

151. Id. at 959.
152. Id. at 960.
153. Id. See also UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 136, at 3.
154. In re C-A, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 960-61.
155. Id. at 956-57.
156. 24 I. & N. Dec. 69 (B.I.A. 2007), petition for review denied, Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509
F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 2007).
157. In re A-M-E, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 70.
158. Id. at 73-74.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 74.
161. Id. at 76.
162. 24 I. & N. Dec. 579 (B.I.A. 2008). See also Joe Palazzolo, Fight Over New Asylum Barrier:
Lawyers Ask Holder for Review, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 2, 2009 (requesting the case be referred to the
Attorney General pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(iii) (2009)). Seemingly in an effort to set clear
precedent, In re E-A-G, 24 I. & N. Dec. 591 (B.I.A. 2007) was decided on July 30, 2007, but published
later as a companion case to In re S-E-G, and references Matter of E-A-G in its published opinion. The
facts, analysis and holding in Matter of E-A-G are similar to Matter of S-E-G but Matter of S-E-G
provides a more detailed analysis of social visibility.

2010]

GANG VIOLENCE ASYLUM

407

requirement for asylum petitions under the social group category.163 The BIA held
that neither Salvadorian youth who have been subject to recruitment efforts by MS13 and who have rejected or resisted membership based on personal, moral, and
religious opposition to the gang lifestyle, nor the family members of such youth,
constitute a particular social group.164 Again, relying on In re A-M-E & J-G-U and
In re C-A, the court held that this category of Salvadorian youth did not have
particular and well-defined boundaries, nor did they possess a recognized level of
social visibility in order to be a particular social group, and in fact failed the
“‘social visibility’ test.”165 Further, the court held that youth is not an immutable
characteristic.166 Though the court did not doubt that MS-13 retaliated against
them for their refusal to join the MS-13, the court refused to recognize the group as
a particular social group because gang violence is widespread across the population
and gangs retaliate against all who threaten or question their power.167 Thus,
respondents failed to differentiate themselves from anyone else who has refused the
gang’s authority or who is perceived by the gang as a threat.168 The BIA’s decision
in In re S-E-G made clear what was left open by In re C-A: that a particular social
group must have at least one trait that is not just “fundamental” or “immutable” but
also “socially visible.” The court acknowledged the refinement to the Acosta
framework, stating that “‘particularity’ and ‘social visibility’ give greater specificity to
the definition of a social group . . . .”169 The BIA continues to adhere to this new
framework.170
The circuit courts are not uniform in their interpretation of In re S-E-G. While
some have adopted the social visibility requirement, others do not think social
visibility is a requirement. For example, in Davila-Mejia v. Mukasey,171 the Eighth
Circuit referenced the social visibility requirement in dicta. In this case, the court
affirmed the BIA’s denial of asylum for Guatemalans who alleged they were
persecuted on account of membership in a group of “competing family business
owners,”172 stating that this was not a cognizable social group because it was not
an immutable trait.173 Noting In re A-M-E & J-G-U, the court also stated that the
petitioners in this instance failed to show that “‘competing family business owners’
gave them sufficient social visibility to be perceived as a group by society.”174
Lastly, the court reasoned that competing family business owners is too amorphous
to be categorized as a social group.175 Similarly, the Second, Sixth, and Eleventh

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

In re S-E-G, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 582.
Id. at 583-84.
Id. at 584-88.
Id. at 583.
Id. at 587.
Id.
In re S-E-G, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 582.
See In re R-A, 24 I. & N. Dec. 629 (B.I.A. 2008).
531 F.3d 624 (8th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 628.
Id. at 628-29.
Id. at 629.
Id.
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Circuits have also adopted this social visibility requirement.176
V. RESISTANCE TO SOCIAL VISIBILITY AS A REQUIREMENT
A. The Ninth and First Circuits
The Ninth Circuit’s evolving approach to social visibility is particularly
interesting and represents movement away from In re S-E-G. As noted before, the
Ninth Circuit had used a “voluntary association” framework for determining social
group status, but this approach was strongly criticized and rejected by other
jurisdictions.177 In 2008, in Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey,178 Santos-Lemus appealed
to the BIA for asylum arguing, in part, that he was persecuted in his home country
of El Salvador on account of his membership in “the class of young men in El
Salvador who resist the violence and intimidation of gang rule.”179 The BIA held
below that this group lacked both the requested particularity and social visibility.180
The Ninth Circuit noted that this social group was a matter of first impression for
the court but, deferring to In re S-E-G, determined that this group was “too loosely
defined to meet the requirement for particularity” and was even broader than the
social group in In re S-E-G.181 Again relying on In re S-E-G, the court held that
Santos-Lemus’s group lacked social visibility because “there [was] little evidence
that Salvadoran youth who [were] recruited by gangs but refuse[d] to join . . .
would be perceived as a group by society, or that these individuals suffer[ed] from
a higher incidence of crime than the rest of the population.”182 Further, the court
reasoned that, because gang violence was highly prevalent within El Salvador, the
applicant’s stated social group was not one that set him apart from the general
population, nor was he persecuted by the gang because of his membership in that
group.183
However, more recently, the Ninth Circuit has seemed to renege the social
visibility approach. In Donchev v. Mukasey,184 the Ninth Circuit, addressing a gang
related asylum claim stated that:
To determine whether a claimed group is a “particular social group,” we consider
“whether a group’s shared characteristics gives members social visibility and
whether the group can be defined with sufficient particularity to delimit its
membership.” This attempt at a general definition is instructive, but very abstract.
When we are talking about membership in something other than a tribe or clan,
this definition is not very helpful to deciding cases because the abstractness allows

176. See, e.g., Jiang v. Mukasey, 296 F. App’x 166, 168 (2d Cir. 2008); Guzman-Cubias v. Holder,
323 F. App’x 42 (2d Cir. 2009); Flores v. Mukasey, 297 F. App’x 389 (6th Cir. 2008); Gomez-Benitez
v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 295 F. App’x 324 (11th Cir. 2008).
177. In re C-A, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 956-57 (B.I.A. 2006).
178. 542 F.3d 738 (9th Cir. 2008).
179. Id. at 741.
180. Id. See also Arteaga v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 2007).
181. Santos-Lemus, 542 F.3d at 745-46.
182. Id. at 746 (citations omitted).
183. Id.
184. 553 F.3d 1206 (9th Cir. 2009).
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The decision highlights that while social visibility may be helpful, it is not
determinative of the existence of a social group. However, most recently the Ninth
Circuit returned to its Santos-Lemus holding, stating that resistance to gang
membership is not a protected ground for the same reasons as in In re S-E-G and
Santos-Lemus.186
Similarly to the Ninth Circuit in Donchev, in Scatambuli v. Holder,187 the First
Circuit interpreted the BIA’s decision in In re C-A as a substantial break from
Acosta because it added a social visibility requirement.188 In this case, a Brazilian
family claimed asylum based on fear of persecution for their status as government
informants against a Brazilian smuggling ring.189 The BIA denied their claim, and
the Scatambuli family appealed, arguing that the BIA improperly relied on the
social visibility component.190 The BIA reasoned that petitioners had not shown
they possess characteristics that would make them outwardly visible in order for
society to recognize them as informants.191
Reviewing the BIA’s legal
interpretations de novo, the First Circuit surveyed other circuit courts’ use of the
BIA’s social visibility requirement and concluded that social visibility is only a
relevant consideration.192 Ultimately, the court denied review, reasoning that the
BIA’s findings were based on substantial evidence and that petitioners did not
suffer persecution, nor were they socially visible.193
B. Department of Justice
In 2000, the Department of Justice proposed changes to the Code of Federal
Regulations that would have brought substantial clarity to the “particular social
group” definition. These regulations would have codified the Acosta approach
requiring members to share a common, immutable trait.194 The rules also included
factors to be considered in determining the existence of a social group, such as
whether the group was closely affiliated or recognized and understood by society as
distinct. However, it was clear in the proposed regulations that such factors were
not required.195

185. Id. at 1215-16. The court ultimately denied the claim for asylum, holding that those who have
declined to join gangs chose the course of conduct that led to the harm, and thus their social group claim
was not based on a fundamental or immutable trait. Id. at 1220. This seems to be a misinterpretation of
facts by the judges or, perhaps, a failure to properly brief the court on the nature of the Mara. See supra
notes 15-37 and accompanying text, discussing the nature of the Mara.
186. Barrios v. Holder, No. 06-74983, 2009 WL 2882868, at *3 (9th Cir. Sept. 10, 2009).
187. 558 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2009).
188. Id. at 59.
189. Id. at 55.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 57.
192. Id. at 59.
193. Scatambuli, 558 F.3d at 61.
194. Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588, 76,593 (Dec. 7, 2000). If adopted,
this requirement would be included in 8 C.F.R. § 208.15(C)(1). Id.
195. Id. at 76, 594.
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C. UNHCR Brief
In 2007, in In re Thomas,196 the UNHCR filed an amicus curiae brief in
support of the asylum applicant on appeal to the BIA.197 The UNHCR argued that
the suggested analysis for asylum claims in In re C-A is inconsistent with the
UNHCR guidelines.198 UNHCR clarified that the new definition for particular
social group announced in the 2002 Guidelines was a two-part approach: If the
immutability requirement was not satisfied, then the court should undertake a
second inquiry to determine if the stated social group was perceived as a
cognizable group within the applicant’s society.199 Further, the UNHCR argued that
there was no requirement that “the members of the group . . . be visible to society at
large,” using homosexuals in Cuba and tribal members who oppose female genital
mutilation as examples of such groups.200 Lastly, the brief stated that the UNHCR
Guidelines were “intended to create alternative approaches for particular social
group analysis rather than a dual requirement, and ‘social visibility’ [was] not a
requirement of the definition.”201
D. Canadian Supreme Court: Protected Characteristics Approach
The Canadian Supreme Court, in Canada v. Ward202 addressed the meaning of
“particular social group” under the 1951 Refugee Convention. Although the
Supreme Court remanded the case back to the Immigration and Refugee Board,203
the case remains important for its particular social group analysis. Ward was a
former member of the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) and was sentenced
to death for aiding the escape of hostages.204 Ward sought asylum in Canada based
on his membership in the INLA.205 Relying heavily on the In re Acosta framework
and the UNHCR Handbook, the court adopted a three prong approach to determining
membership in a particular social group, under which an applicant’s asserted social

196. Thomas v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2004), en banc reh’g granted, Thomas v. Ashcroft,
382 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), Thomas v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc rehearing),
cert. granted, vacated, and remanded, Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183 (2006). The Supreme Court
remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit, ordering the Ninth Circuit to remand the case back to the BIA
for a determination of whether family members of Thomas constituted a particular social group.
Gonzales, 547 U.S. at 186-87. The Ninth Circuit had decided that the family members were a particular
social group, although the BIA had not, which the Supreme Court decided on certiorari was a procedural
error because circuit courts do not conduct de novo review of the BIA cases, and so the Supreme Court
remanded the case back to the Ninth Circuit. Id. at 185-86. The BIA opinion was remanded from the
Ninth Circuit and was not published.
197. Brief for the Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees as Amici Curiae Supporting
Claimants, In re Thomas, No. A75-597-033/-04/-05/-06 (BIA Jan. 25, 2007), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/45c34c244.html (last visited Aug. 17, 2009) [hereinafter UNHCR
Brief in Thomas].
198. Id. at 7.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 8 (emphasis omitted).
201. Id. at 9.
202. Canada v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689 (Can.).
203. Id. at 700.
204. Id. at 755.
205. Id. at 700-01.
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group must fit into any one of the three categories: “(1) groups defined by an innate or
unchangeable characteristic; (2) groups whose members voluntarily associate for
reasons so fundamental to their human dignity that they should not be forced to
forsake the association; and (3) groups associated by a former voluntary status,
unalterable due to its historical permanence.”206 The court denied Ward’s claim,
reasoning that his fear “was based on his action, not on his affiliation.”207 Thus,
Ward’s significance is that it broadened the Acosta analysis by recognizing groups
based on “voluntary association” or an association with a group that they are capable
of changing.208 Although the court did not provide a rationale for broadening the
analysis, Professor Aleinikoff suggests that the court was expanding the scope of
protection to individuals who should not be asked to forsake an association that is
fundamental, covering things like freedom of thought.209
Professor Aleinikoff labeled the Ward analysis the “protected characteristics”
approach and pointed out that the Ward framework looked to internal factors and
innate characteristics shared by groups, not the social perception of the group.210
Consequently, unlike the requirements imposed by the BIA and circuit courts, the
Canadian Supreme Court has not adopted a social visibility requirement.
E. Australian High Court
In Applicant S v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs,211 the
High Court of Australia expressly rejected the notion that a social group must be
perceived within society as a collection of individuals who are “set apart from the
rest of that society.”212 In this case, an Afghan male was seeking asylum in
Australia under the 1951 Refugee Convention after fleeing from the Taliban.213 He
feared that if he stayed in Afghanistan, or returned there, he would be recruited by
the Taliban for military service as he had been previously.214 His asserted social
group was “young, able-bodied Afghan men.”215 The minister, on behalf of the
Australian Government, argued that there was a “social visibility” requirement in
order to qualify as a particular social group. The High Court disagreed:
There is nothing in the relevant Article of the Convention or [section] 36 of the
[Migration] Act adopting it which states or implies such a requirement. The
question is not whether some undefined section of, or minority, or majority, or
leaders of a country regard and recognise a particular group as a social group, as
relevant and helpful to the giving of an answer to the correct question, an answer
to that question might be. The correct question is simply whether an identifiable
group or class of persons constitutes a particular social group. The attitude
expressed by acts or words of people within a country towards others may, and

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Id. at 739.
Id. at 745.
Aleinikoff, supra note 1, at 269-70.
Id. at 270.
Id.
(2004) 217 C.L.R. 387 (Austl.).
Id. ¶ 62.
Id. ¶ 56.
Id.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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usually will provide cogent evidence that those others are of a particular social
216
group, but such acts or words cannot be conclusive of the issue.

However, the court denied asylum finding that conscription into a military force
does not amount to persecution.217 The court was careful to assert that, while
evidence demonstrating that a society perceives a particular social group is
influential, generally a particular social group must be objectively cognizable
within the relevant society and have characteristics to set it apart from society.218
However, a particular society group may exist even if it is not perceived by
society.219 The court adopted a similar framework to that in In re Acosta:
Thus, although the group must be a cognisable group within the society, it is not
necessary that it be recognised generally within the society as a collection of
individuals which constitutes a group that is set apart from the rest of the
community. To qualify as a particular social group, it is enough that objectively
there is an identifiable group of persons with a social presence in a country, set
apart from other members of that society, and united by a common characteristic,
attribute, activity, belief, interest, goal, aim or principle. As I have indicated, it is
not necessary that the persecutor or persecutors actually perceive the group as
constituting “a particular social group[.”] It is enough that the persecutor or
persecutors single out the asylum-seeker for being a member of a class whose
members possess a “uniting” feature or attribute, and the persons in that class are
220
cognisable objectively as a particular social group.

The Acosta approach is also followed in New Zealand and the United Kingdom.221
VI. EXAMINING SOCIAL VISIBILITY
A. The Definition Itself & Balancing Tension
The social group category has always been, and should remain, a forum for
those who have more particularized claims. The absence of a highly particularized
definition allows for evolution in refugee claims as societies evolve. However, this
places judges presiding over asylum cases in a difficult position: they must
construe “particular social group” in a way that is broad enough to allow for
evolving claims but not so broad as to expand the scope of protection beyond the
intent of the 1951 Convention222 or make the other categories (race, nationality,

216. Applicant S, 217 C.L.R. ¶ 98.
217. Id. ¶ 101.
218. Id. ¶¶ 61-62.
219. Id. ¶¶ 67-69. As an example, the court used homosexuals, who may either be targeted for being
homosexuals or the existence of homosexuality within their culture may be denied completely. Id.
Homosexuals are objectively a cognizable social group whether or not they are perceived, or even
recognized, within society.
220. Id. ¶ 69.
221. See Aleinikoff, supra note 1, at 273-75, 280 (discussing Islam v. Sec’y of State for the Home
Dep’t, available at 11 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 496 (1999)); New Zealand seemed to have rejected the social
perception approach as overly broad in In re G.J., New Zealand Refugee Status Appeals Authority
(RSAA), Refugee Appeal No. 1312/93, available at REFUGEE LAW CENTER, INC., GENDER ASYLUM
LAW IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES 522-80 (1st ed. 1999).
222. See Akinikoff, supra note 1, at 265-66.
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political opinion, religion) “superfluous.”223 Also, there is the fear that granting
asylum to any one group will open the floodgates to many other types of claims.
The imposition of “social visibility” is the BIA’s attempt to refine the social group
category by applying a limiting principle. Immigration judges are under a lot of
pressure. Asylum claims are increasing, and there is substantial backlog in the
system with applicants waiting years for their claims to be heard before the BIA.
Additionally, there is intense political pressure from the Department of Homeland
Security and a national “anti-immigrant” sentiment. The BIA is attempting to
balance these pressures against an individual’s need for asylum.
Although both external societal pressures and a need to refine the social group
definition are valid reasons for changing the balance, the BIA has found an
imperfect balance. The social visibility requirement narrows the “particular social
group” definition to such an extent that it will stifle the development of future
gang-based asylum social group claims and other social group claims as well.
Thus, it will no longer allow claims it has in the past.224 The only justification the
BIA has offered is that social visibility would bring greater specificity to the
definition—but it did not explain why social visibility is the appropriate narrowing
principle. More importantly, the BIA failed to offer a clear definition of “social
visibility” in any of the cases in which it chose to impose the requirement. Further,
the BIA offered no explanation for what necessitated a break from the Acosta
framework. For years, Acosta was seen by the BIA, and most circuit courts, as
striking the appropriate balance for construing the social group definition. The
Acosta framework was clear and led to predictable results. Acosta also set forth a
burden of proof that was substantial but not insurmountable. The addition of a
social visibility requirement only adds to this burden and will require additional
resources to establish the existence of this “external” factor. Thus, the lack of a
clear definition combined with the heightened burden changes the balance almost
positively in favor of denial of asylum.
Internationally, there are two major problems with the social visibility
requirement. First, by breaking with Acosta, the BIA is moving away from an
analysis that has become international precedent. The BIA’s requirement stands
alone in the worldwide interpretation of the term “social group.” Should the BIA
deviate from what is so widely accepted precedent, it would be prudent to provide
223. Expert Roundtable, supra note 112, at 313.
224. For an analysis of the potential effects of social visibility on gender claims, such as domestic
violence and sexual orientation, see generally Fatma E. Marouf, The Emerging Importance of “Social
Visibility” in Defining a “Particular Social Group” and Its Potential Impact on Asylum Claims Related
to Sexual Orientation and Gender, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 47 (2008). See also Heyman, supra note
108, at 767. Heyman’s article focuses on persecution of victims of domestic violence by non-state
actors. Heyman argues that since the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Elias-Zacharias asylum cases
have focused on the “nexus issue”—that the persecution must be on account of the state ground. Id. at
802. Based on this analysis, the BIA has concluded that domestic violence is a marital problem, not
persecution based on a social group. Id. at 794. Heyman argues that asylum law does not require a
“conscious intent” of the persecutor to punish based on membership in a particular social group (or any
other group) and a court may alternatively inquire into whether the persecution intended to cause the
harm. Id. at 803-04. The motive or causation factor is inappropriate when the persecutor is a non-state
actor due to the complex nature of the non-state actor and poses “insurmountable barriers to relief for
victims of domestic violence.” Id. at 790, 793, 802.
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an explanation why (such as the problems caused by the Acosta framework or why
the court sees social visibility as an appropriate addition to social group claims).
International uniformity should be valued because asylum stems from an
international convention, signed by multiple countries, many of who have referred
to the United States jurisprudence as precedential. Breaking with what is now
international precedent opens the United States to serious criticism. Refugee law
has many humanitarian elements and the United States should be begrudged to
deviate from the norm.
Second, the requirement is unsupported by the UNHCR. Although the BIA in
In re C-A stated that the requirement was supported by the UNHCR’s definition of
social group in the 2002 Guidelines, it misconstrued the definition.225 The UNHCR
proposed that social visibility be an alternative test to the Acosta immutability
approach—an inquiry that would take place if the applicant could not meet the
immutability requirement.226 The UNHCR upheld this definition in their amicus
brief filed in In re Thomas, in which the UNHCR pointed out that the proposed
definition does not require that social visibility be present. The UNHCR then
specifically pointed to groups like homosexuals and those who oppose female
genital mutilation as groups worthy of asylum protection under the Convention but
lacking social visibility.227
Importantly, although what the UNHCR says is not expressly binding on the
United States, by being a signatory to the United Nations Refugee Convention the
United States recognized that it would defer to the United Nations as the ultimate
authority on refugee issues. Both the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967
Protocol state that the contracting states:
undertake to co-operate with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees, or any other agency of the United Nations which may succeed it, in
the exercise of its functions, and shall in particular facilitate its duty of supervising
228
the application of the provisions of this Convention [or the Protocol].

The UNHCR has been explicit in its interpretation of “particular social group” and
both the Convention and Protocol advise the BIA to heed their guidance.
As noted by both the BIA in In re C-A and the Ninth Circuit in Donchev, the
use of social visibility began with clan or tribal membership. Such groups are
highly visible and objectively recognized as subsets within society. Clans may also
provide individuals with more than just beliefs but also an identity with a subgroup.
The social group category, however, has always been used for a variety of groups,
not limited to clan membership. Thus, a requirement employed for clan-like
groups should not be imposed on all social groups. Asylum claims based on clan
membership demonstrate that social visibility can be important and compelling
evidence in such cases, but it does not extend from this that social visibility is
appropriate in all instances.
225. See supra notes 130-42 and accompanying text (discussing the UNHCR’s definition of
“particular social group” to include social visibility as an alternative analysis).
226. See UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 136, at 3. This is made explicit by the use of the word “or”
to separate the two tests.
227. See supra notes 195-99 and accompanying text.
228. 1951 Convention, supra note 104, at art. 35(1); 1967 Protocol, supra note 103, at art. II(1).
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B. Analytically Misguided
The BIA’s social visibility requirement is also analytically misguided.
Requiring that a group be visible is close to requiring that the asylum applicant be
part of a cohesive group that society views as closely associating with one another.
However, as discussed previously, it is not required and has been rejected as a
requirement that members of a social group know and associate with one another,
or all share the same characteristics.229 What should matter is not whether society
recognizes the group but rather the persecutor’s ability to see and recognize the
social group.
Evidence of visibility is more appropriate to determine the likelihood of
persecution. If a group is socially visible, it is easier for a persecutor to identify the
group and it is more likely that the individual will be persecuted. However,
persecutors, especially non-state actors such as gangs, target groups, and
individuals for a variety of reasons and are not constrained by visibility. For
example, gang members who go after family members of those who oppose the
gang are not socially visible to society at large but are distinctly visible to the gang
members seeking them for persecution. The gang seeks them out, despite their lack
of visibility (or attempts to hide from the gang) because of their familial
association. Familial association also highlights the confusion over the definition
of social visibility. While the First Circuit has denied a claim based on gang
persecution due to family membership, at least one immigration judge has
interpreted a similar claim to have fulfilled the requisite social visibility.230
The BIA has used evidence of social visibility to show persecution and also for
the stand-alone social visibility requirement. In In re C-A, the court stated that
while past persecution alone does not render a group socially visible, past
persecution may be a relevant factor in considering the group’s visibility in
society.231 Applicants will have proof problems because the fact that a persecutor
was able to seek out the individual proves only that they were visible to the
persecutor, not that they were objectively within society. The BIA recognizes that
social visibility is a good indicator of past persecution but then implies that the
same evidence used for what the persecutor may find visible, can also be used for
what society may find visible. This is misguided because the visibility for
persecution is not the same visibility for the “social visibility test,” and the BIA has
failed to distinguish the two. Beyond evidence of past persecution, the BIA has not
provided applicants with any guidance for how they might prove that their group is
objectively cognizable within society.
C. BIA’s Purpose of Providing Uniformity
As stated before, the BIA’s opinions should provide “clear and uniform
guidance”232 on immigration law to immigration judges, the courts of appeals,
practitioners, and asylum applicants. The social visibility standard, however, is so

229.
230.
231.
232.

Expert Roundtable, supra note 112, at 313.
See supra note 13.
In re C-A, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 960 (B.I.A. 2006).
8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1) (2009).
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abstract and amorphous that it cannot be implemented uniformly and contravenes
the BIA’s purpose. There is no guidance in In re C-A or In re S-E-G about what
social visibility means, what it might look like, or how judges can apply the
standard. Further, social visibility is likely grounded in societal contexts, making it
a fact-based—and not legal—analysis. This gives the immigration judges an
extraordinary amount of discretion to determine whether a group is socially visible.
The Acosta framework, however, confines judges to determining if the stated social
group is fundamental or immutable. This is a more objective analysis; one widely
used by judges in equal protection and due process claims, and as a result, more
likely to lead to consistent results. What is fundamental or immutable is rarely
context specific, nor does it change often. The immutability component allows for
more individualized and evolving claims. The fact specific inquiry will lead to
inconsistent results for similar claims within immigration courts. Further, shifting
the analysis to facts makes evidence and expert testimony more important. In
effect, this will allow only those with more resources who can compile additional
proof of social visibility and financial ability to provide expert testimony to win
their claims.
D. Social Visibility and Humanitarian Goals
Individuals, especially youth, who fundamentally oppose the violent and
coercive tactics of the Mara are worthy of asylum protection. They live in
countries plagued by gang violence, with police forces that are also victims of the
gang’s wrath or engage in persecutory tactics. Citizens targeted for recruitment by
the gang are repeatedly persecuted and often killed. Their choice to live without
violence is not just brave but a fundamental human right that they should not have
to relinquish. Further, individuals who stand up to the gang in such circumstances
are the type of people the United States should embrace.
By imposing a social visibility requirement, the BIA has cut asylum relief off
from an entire group of worthy individuals. Those who oppose gangs are not
cohesive groups; they do not generally bind together in opposition, nor are they
socially visible because they do not outwardly show their resistance—it would only
make them more susceptible to the Mara. The visibility requirement poses
problems to other groups as well, such as victims of domestic violence,
homosexuals and those who fear or are victims of female genital mutilation, even
though these groups have been recognized in the past.233 Likewise, these groups
would have problems of proof, as they would have to assert that they are
recognized within society.234 For example, domestic violence usually happens in
the private domain, and while society may perceive domestic violence to be a
problem, it likely does not see victims of domestic violence as a cohesive segment
of society.235 The effects of this requirement will be unacceptable to a society that
is likely to view these groups as deserving—and even as discrete groups—though
not socially visible.
233. See generally Marouf, supra note 224, at 78-98; Jiang, 296 F. App’x at 168; Flores, 297 F.
App’x 324; Santos-Lemus, 542 F.3d 738.
234. See Marouf, supra note 224, at 78-98.
235. Id. at 94-98.
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Social group claims can also be based on a fundamental association or belief
that the applicant should not be required to change.236 Those who claim asylum
because of resistance to gangs make a fundamental choice to live peacefully. This
choice is similar to other choices those granted asylum have made, such as those
who oppose female genital mutilation. Both groups are “unable by their own
actions, or as a matter of conscience should not be required [to change], to avoid
persecution.”237 Those who oppose female genital mutilation have been granted
asylum in the past,238 and like those who resist gangs, they believe they have a right
to live without physically harming themselves. This could not be changed without
significant destruction to their beliefs. Further, neither group is readily visible to
society at large.
VII. SOLUTIONS
Although there is little support for social visibility as a requirement in
assessing the existence of a social group, there is support in the UNHCR,
Department of Justice-proposed rules, and circuit court decisions for the use of
social visibility as an important factor. The Department of Justice suggested that
societal recognition of the group may be considered by the judge. In 2002 the
UNHCR urged that the social visibility test be used by all signatory states as coequal with the Acosta immutability test, allowing applicants to fall in either group
and be granted relief. This is the approach that Professor Aleinikoff suggests.239
However, because social visibility as an alternative test is untested in any
jurisdiction, the BIA should proceed cautiously. While the two tests together
would maintain the narrow Acosta framework, they would open up asylum to
alternative groups currently denied relief because they are based solely on socially
recognized associations, not characteristics that are fundamental or immutable,
such as students and union members.240 For example, school children targeted by
gangs might have a cognizable claim as school children. Their status as students
likely would not be considered immutable because it is easy to change and, like
youth, is not permanent.241 However, both traits make the group highly visible. If
the school-aged applicants could show that they were targeted by the gangs because
of this status, they would have a claim under this new category. There is
substantial evidence to support that gangs target children because they are easy to
coerce. Further, school children constitute only a limited group of individuals.
Their claim is not based on their fear of persecution but on their label as school
children. The common characteristics are their age and schooling, not likelihood of
persecution.242
Despite this support, what is most important is that the BIA clarify that social
visibility is not a requirement. If the BIA tests the new definition, they should

236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 223-34.
Id. at 234.
In re Fauziya, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 368.
Aleinikoff, supra note 1, at 309-11.
Id. at 295. See also supra note 224.
See supra notes 121-28, 162-66 and accompanying text.
See Expert Roundtable, supra note 112, at 313.
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proceed cautiously by picking a case that makes clear the utility of visibility. The
BIA should also consider withholding the case from publication until they have
issued a few precedential decisions to release together to provide better guidance to
the legal community. If the BIA decides not to adopt the new definition, they
should clarify that in In re C-A the court was positing a factor, not a requirement,
and then overrule In re E-A-G and In re S-E-G to the extent that they impose a
social visibility requirement. It would also be useful for the BIA to include further
guidance about when social visibility is appropriate, and to indicate their
willingness to explore visibility as an alternative to the immutability approach in
limited instances, such as clan membership. While the BIA has explicitly imposed
social visibility on gang related asylum claims, the BIA could also clarify that the
social visibility framework does not apply to domestic violence, homosexuality, or
female genital mutilation cases.
Similar to this approach, the BIA could refer a case for review by the Attorney
General or the Attorney General could direct the board to refer the case to him/her
for review.243 If the Attorney General issues an opinion, it must be in writing244
and will be binding precedent on all asylum officers and judges, including the
BIA.245 This approach would be ideal because it would be binding throughout all
the circuit courts and be more efficient.
Alternatively, the United States Supreme Court could take an asylum case
from a circuit court which imposes the visibility requirement. The Supreme Court
could then affirm Acosta and clarify that social visibility is not—and has never
been—a requirement. However, this is not likely, despite the circuit split and
ample controversy, because the Supreme Court has denied recent social visibility
cases.246
On the other hand, a slower process might be the best solution. Circuit Courts
have the ability to reject the BIA’s “guidance” and so the individual circuits could
reject social visibility as a requirement, as the Ninth and First Circuits have in
certain instances. Functionally, this would overturn the BIA’s approach because
the circuit courts have jurisdiction over BIA cases arising within their circuit.
Beyond just taking a long time, there are other drawbacks to this approach. This
easily gives rise to a circuit split and the lack of guidance is confusing—leaving
applicants without clear precedent and it creates tension between the circuit courts
and the BIA.
Lastly, the Department of Justice could refine the rules proposed in 2000, and
Congress could adopt them. Regardless of the framework chosen, this approach
would be binding on all courts and would potentially be less nebulous than case
law. The BIA could also request specific comments from the Department of State
on the issue of social visibility, within the context of a specific case.247 These
comments would become part of the record of the case248 and could easily settle the
243. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1) (2009).
244. Id. § 1003.1(h)(2).
245. Id. § 1003.1(f) & (g).
246. See In re C-A, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, aff’d sub nom. Castillo-Arias v. Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 1190
(11th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, Castillo-Arias v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 1115 (2007).
247. 8 C.F.R. § 208.11 (2009).
248. Id. § 208.11(d).
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matter within a factual context that would provide useful guidance to the legal
community.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Those who resist the Mara risk their lives for their beliefs. However, despite
their lack of recognition within the community, they are fundamentally opposed to
how gangs treat people. These individuals are left to their own devices as the Mara
continue to control villages in Latin America. Often the crimes and human targets
of the Mara are random—committed towards no group in particular. However, for
many individuals and families the violence was not random, it was persecution: the
individuals were repeatedly targeted, threatened, beaten, robbed and in all
likelihood would have been killed by the Mara if they did not get away.
When the Refugee Act of 1980 was passed it was regarded as “one of the most
important pieces of humanitarian legislation ever enacted by a U.S. Congress.”249
Its ability to protect victims of gang violence, however, has fallen by the wayside
because the BIA has overly narrowed the social group definition. Those who stand
up to the Mara are not just brave, but resilient in their beliefs that the acts
committed by Mara members are amoral. Their choice not to associate with gangs
should never be compromised and they are individuals worthy of asylum
protection. Further, the BIA has other ways of narrowing the particular social
group definition without imposing additional requirements. The applicant’s burden
of proof is already quite substantial, and many gang based asylum claims already
fail without the social visibility requirement because they cannot show that they
were persecuted on account of membership in their stated social group.
However, the social visibility test imposed by the BIA is not without merit.
Properly refined, social visibility may be a way to provide asylum to people not
currently covered under the traditional Acosta framework, and thus this proposal is
worth exploring. However, the BIA should proceed cautiously, considering not
just gang-based asylum claims but also other highly used social groups, such as
homosexuals and victims of domestic violence. This exploration would be
supported by the UNHCR and refugee scholars such as Professor Aleinikoff.

249. 126 CONG. REC. H 4501, 1500 (daily ed. Mar. 4, 1980) (statement of Rep. Rodino).

